On y lit que le pessimisme des examinateurs est motivé par :
(a) le resserrement du crédit en général;
(b) une augmentation des primes de risques pour un nombre accru d'émetteurs de l'eurozone;
(c) un remboursement des dettes simultané par les ménages et les Etats...
(d) ...affaiblissant les prévisions de croissance;
(e) une discorde prolongée entre les gouvernements sur la bonne approche des défis.
C'est pas faux, aurait dit Perceval. Pour approfondir on se réfèrera au mode d'emploi de S&P's que l'on consultera ici.
Ils mettent aussi le doigt sur un défaut d'appréciation des dirigeants des pays "forts" envers les pays "faibles" de l'eurozone. Bien au-delà du laxisme fiscal des pays entourant les pays "forts", les problèmes financiers de la zone découlent tout autant des déséquilibres de compétivité extérieure entre les deux groupes. Une réforme procédant de la seule austérité fiscale est vouée à l'échec puisque la consommation domestique tombera à proportion de l'insécurité du travail et de l'argent disponible, érodant les rentrées fiscales.
Il est vrai que le gouvernement Merkel cantonne son diagnostic aux déséquilibres budgétaires insoutenables de ses partenaires, en oubliant que ce sont aussi ses clients et que les déséquilibres commerciaux intra-européens sont au moins aussi graves dans cette crise. L'Allemagne peut-elle longtemps drainer l'argent des pays latins et compter dessus pour le futur ? A l'évidence, non.
Ce qui ne laisse de surprendre est le bon résultat malgré tout concédé par S&P's à l'Allemagne et à six autres pays qui ont des positions extérieures plus sûres que les nôtres. Mais l'analyse est mondiale et c'est au-delà de l'eurozone sur la totalité du marché planétaire qu'ils sont jugés. L'Allemagne est un acteur industriel mondial, appuyé sur ses maquiladoras orientales qui ont poussé jusqu'à l'Oural. Les "petits" pays de l'économie rhénane - on pourrait parler d'une renaissance de la Hanse² - sont tous extravertis vers le grand large. En revanche, ils ont tout à craindre d'une contraction de la demande mondiale que pourrait déclencher une crise grave de l'Union européenne, premier PIB du monde. On se mord la queue.
Le réglage des politiques de sortie de crise doit être plus fin que les remèdes brutaux qu'on entend ci et là si nous ne voulons pas mourir guéris. Sans crever la consommation par des mesures budgétaires drastiques, le gouvernement doit saisir l'occasion qui - divine surprise - lui est donnée de redresser les comptes publics en évitant l'impact d'une grave récession. Comment ? En détruisant toutes les inutilités qui encrassent l'Etat. Nous en avons déjà parlé.
Le nombre de facteurs d'influence est si grand que nul ne peut savoir désormais si les taux vont monter, asséchant le Trésor public et le crédit aux entreprises. La situation des banques est floue et les pronostics relèvent du tirage de cartes - on se moquait avant le crash de l'inextricabilité des bilans bancaires chinois ! Ce qui est sûr par contre, c'est que le carnaval électoral quinquennal est très mal placé sur l'agenda, et que les programmes promus par les candidats sont jusqu'ici très au-dessous du niveau requis.
Standard&Poor's n'est pas le Vatican de la finance vagabonde. C'est une agence de notation destinée aux acteurs de marché qui engagent leur argent, pas le four infernal des Illuminati. Si l'humiliation subie nous aide à regarder les réalités comme on les voit souvent mieux de l'extérieur, la pénitence ne sera pas inutile. Mais pour le moment, nos dirigeants et candidats ont du mal à s'arracher aux gamineries.
Communiqué du vendredi 13
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services -- Jan. 13, 2012
We have lowered the long-term ratings on Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain by two notches; lowered the long-term ratings on Austria, France, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, by one notch; and affirmed the long-term ratings on Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
All ratings have been removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011 (except for Cyprus, which was first placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).
. See list below for full details on the affected ratings.
The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain are negative, indicating that we believe that there is at least a one-in-three chance that the rating will be lowered in 2012 or 2013.
The outlook horizon for issuers with investment-grade ratings is up to two years, and for issuers with speculative-grade ratings up to one year. The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Germany and Slovakia are stable.
We assigned recovery ratings of '4' to both Cyprus and Portugal, in accordance with our practice to assign recovery ratings to issuers rated in the speculative-grade category, indicating an expected recovery of 30%-50% should a default occur in the future.
Today's rating actions are primarily driven by our assessment that the policy initiatives that have been taken by European policymakers in recent weeks may be insufficient to fully address ongoing systemic stresses in the eurozone. In our view, these stresses include: (1) tightening credit conditions, (2) an increase in risk premiums for a widening group of eurozone issuers, (3) a simultaneous attempt to delever by governments and households, (4) weakening economic growth prospects, and (5) an open and prolonged dispute among European policymakers over the proper approach to address challenges.
The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements from policymakers, lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.
We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers' rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national tax revenues.
Accordingly, in line with our published sovereign criteria, we have adjusted downward our political scores (one of the five key factors in our criteria) for those eurozone sovereigns we had previously scored in our two highest categories. This reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of European policymaking and political institutions have not been as strong as we believe are called for by the severity of a broadening and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.
In our view, it is increasingly likely that refinancing costs for certain countries may remain elevated, that credit availability and economic growth may further decelerate, and that pressure on financing conditions may persist. Accordingly, for those sovereigns we consider most at risk of an economic downturn and deteriorating funding conditions, for example due to their large cross-border financing needs, we have adjusted our external score downward.
On the other hand, we believe that eurozone monetary authorities have been instrumental in averting a collapse of market confidence. We see that the European Central Bank has successfully eased collateral requirements, allowing an ever expanding pool of assets to be used as collateral for its funding operations, and has lowered the fixed rate to 1% on its main refinancing operation, an all-time low. Most importantly in our view, it has engaged in unprecedented repurchase operations for financial institutions, greatly relieving the near-term funding pressures for banks. Accordingly we did not adjust the initial monetary score on any of the 16 sovereigns under review.
Moreover, we affirmed the ratings on the seven eurozone sovereigns that we believe are likely to be more resilient in light of their relatively strong external positions and less leveraged public and private sectors. These credit strengths remain robust enough, in our opinion, to neutralise the potential ratings impact from the lowering of our political score.
However, for those sovereigns with negative outlooks, we believe that downside risks persist and that a more adverse economic and financial environment could erode their relative strengths within the next year or two to a degree that in our view could warrant a further downward revision of their long-term ratings.
We believe that the main downside risks that could affect eurozone sovereigns to various degrees are related to the possibility of further significant fiscal deterioration as a consequence of a more recessionary macroeconomic environment and/or vulnerabilities to further intensification and broadening of risk aversion among investors, jeopardizing funding access at sustainable rates. A more severe financial and economic downturn than we currently envisage (see "Sovereign Risk Indicators", published Dec. 28, 2011) could also lead to rising stress levels in the European banking system, potentially leading to additional fiscal costs for the sovereigns through various bank workout or recapitalization programs. Furthermore, we believe that there is a risk that reform fatigue could be mounting, especially in those countries that have experienced deep recessions and where growth prospects remain bleak, which could eventually lead us to the view that lower levels of predictability exist in policy orientation, and thus to a further downward adjustment of our political score.
Finally, while we currently assess the monetary authorities' response to the eurozone's financial problems as broadly adequate, our view could change as the crisis and the response to it evolves. If we lowered our initial monetary score for all eurozone sovereigns as a result, this could have negative consequences for the ratings on a number of countries.
In this context, we would note that the ratings on the eurozone sovereigns remain at comparatively high levels, with only three below investment grade (Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece). Historically, investment-grade-rated sovereigns have experienced very low default rates. From 1975 to 2010, the 15-year cumulative default rate for sovereigns rated in investment grade was 1.02%, and 0.00% for sovereigns rated in the 'A' category or higher. During this period, 97.78% of sovereigns rated 'AAA' at the beginning of the year retained their rating at the end of the year.
Following today's rating actions, Standard & Poor's will issue separate media releases concerning affected ratings on the funds, government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance companies, public finance, and structured finance sectors in due course.
(suivent les clés de discernement et la liste des pays européens)
Notes
(1) Les abonnés à Twitter sont effarés de la présence de tous les instants des ministres Besson et Morano sur le réseau. Les chiffres d'émissions accolés à leur profil sont sidérants et démontrent leur complète inutilité dans la fonction, tout le travail étant assuré par le cabinet ad hoc, justifiant en creux une préférence du gouvernement des professionnels à celui des touristes.
(2) Il est vraiment curieux de voir ré-émerger cette vieille solidarité économique, qui a été décrite dans le trimestriel La Toile (n°10 clic)
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services -- Jan. 13, 2012
We have lowered the long-term ratings on Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain by two notches; lowered the long-term ratings on Austria, France, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, by one notch; and affirmed the long-term ratings on Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
All ratings have been removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011 (except for Cyprus, which was first placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).
. See list below for full details on the affected ratings.
The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain are negative, indicating that we believe that there is at least a one-in-three chance that the rating will be lowered in 2012 or 2013.
The outlook horizon for issuers with investment-grade ratings is up to two years, and for issuers with speculative-grade ratings up to one year. The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Germany and Slovakia are stable.
We assigned recovery ratings of '4' to both Cyprus and Portugal, in accordance with our practice to assign recovery ratings to issuers rated in the speculative-grade category, indicating an expected recovery of 30%-50% should a default occur in the future.
Today's rating actions are primarily driven by our assessment that the policy initiatives that have been taken by European policymakers in recent weeks may be insufficient to fully address ongoing systemic stresses in the eurozone. In our view, these stresses include: (1) tightening credit conditions, (2) an increase in risk premiums for a widening group of eurozone issuers, (3) a simultaneous attempt to delever by governments and households, (4) weakening economic growth prospects, and (5) an open and prolonged dispute among European policymakers over the proper approach to address challenges.
The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements from policymakers, lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.
We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers' rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national tax revenues.
Accordingly, in line with our published sovereign criteria, we have adjusted downward our political scores (one of the five key factors in our criteria) for those eurozone sovereigns we had previously scored in our two highest categories. This reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of European policymaking and political institutions have not been as strong as we believe are called for by the severity of a broadening and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.
In our view, it is increasingly likely that refinancing costs for certain countries may remain elevated, that credit availability and economic growth may further decelerate, and that pressure on financing conditions may persist. Accordingly, for those sovereigns we consider most at risk of an economic downturn and deteriorating funding conditions, for example due to their large cross-border financing needs, we have adjusted our external score downward.
On the other hand, we believe that eurozone monetary authorities have been instrumental in averting a collapse of market confidence. We see that the European Central Bank has successfully eased collateral requirements, allowing an ever expanding pool of assets to be used as collateral for its funding operations, and has lowered the fixed rate to 1% on its main refinancing operation, an all-time low. Most importantly in our view, it has engaged in unprecedented repurchase operations for financial institutions, greatly relieving the near-term funding pressures for banks. Accordingly we did not adjust the initial monetary score on any of the 16 sovereigns under review.
Moreover, we affirmed the ratings on the seven eurozone sovereigns that we believe are likely to be more resilient in light of their relatively strong external positions and less leveraged public and private sectors. These credit strengths remain robust enough, in our opinion, to neutralise the potential ratings impact from the lowering of our political score.
However, for those sovereigns with negative outlooks, we believe that downside risks persist and that a more adverse economic and financial environment could erode their relative strengths within the next year or two to a degree that in our view could warrant a further downward revision of their long-term ratings.
We believe that the main downside risks that could affect eurozone sovereigns to various degrees are related to the possibility of further significant fiscal deterioration as a consequence of a more recessionary macroeconomic environment and/or vulnerabilities to further intensification and broadening of risk aversion among investors, jeopardizing funding access at sustainable rates. A more severe financial and economic downturn than we currently envisage (see "Sovereign Risk Indicators", published Dec. 28, 2011) could also lead to rising stress levels in the European banking system, potentially leading to additional fiscal costs for the sovereigns through various bank workout or recapitalization programs. Furthermore, we believe that there is a risk that reform fatigue could be mounting, especially in those countries that have experienced deep recessions and where growth prospects remain bleak, which could eventually lead us to the view that lower levels of predictability exist in policy orientation, and thus to a further downward adjustment of our political score.
Finally, while we currently assess the monetary authorities' response to the eurozone's financial problems as broadly adequate, our view could change as the crisis and the response to it evolves. If we lowered our initial monetary score for all eurozone sovereigns as a result, this could have negative consequences for the ratings on a number of countries.
In this context, we would note that the ratings on the eurozone sovereigns remain at comparatively high levels, with only three below investment grade (Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece). Historically, investment-grade-rated sovereigns have experienced very low default rates. From 1975 to 2010, the 15-year cumulative default rate for sovereigns rated in investment grade was 1.02%, and 0.00% for sovereigns rated in the 'A' category or higher. During this period, 97.78% of sovereigns rated 'AAA' at the beginning of the year retained their rating at the end of the year.
Following today's rating actions, Standard & Poor's will issue separate media releases concerning affected ratings on the funds, government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance companies, public finance, and structured finance sectors in due course.
(suivent les clés de discernement et la liste des pays européens)
Notes
(1) Les abonnés à Twitter sont effarés de la présence de tous les instants des ministres Besson et Morano sur le réseau. Les chiffres d'émissions accolés à leur profil sont sidérants et démontrent leur complète inutilité dans la fonction, tout le travail étant assuré par le cabinet ad hoc, justifiant en creux une préférence du gouvernement des professionnels à celui des touristes.
(2) Il est vraiment curieux de voir ré-émerger cette vieille solidarité économique, qui a été décrite dans le trimestriel La Toile (n°10 clic)
her ami, j'avoue que je comprends de moins en moins la situation.
RépondreSupprimerS&P dégrade la France mais Moody's confirme notre "triple A".
On a l'impression que nous sommes dans un gigantesque monopoly.
Tout ce que je sais c'est que c'est la sanction d'un état devenu obèse et d'une vie à crédit, mais je déteste autant cette "dictature du marché" dont on a l'impression que son siège est ailleurs et qui impose aux nations son unique modèle.
Vous ne partagez pas sans aucun doute ma position étant un adepte de l'école libérale à la "Bastiat".
Vous le savez, je suis plutôt du côté de la DSE et du "distributisme".
A part ça, cela n'a rien à voir, mais je préfère votre nouveau "design".
Bien à vous.
La note S&P de la France est désormais : AA+/Negative/A-1+ (voir la table des notations).
RépondreSupprimerSeule la première note a changé de AAA à AA+. A voir la seconde qui est maintenue, on ne peut dire que nous étions au top d'autant que nos grandes banques n'y sont pas non plus. /Negative est le pronostic de la note suivante ; et A-1+ la note à court terme qui veut dire zéro risque.
Les agences ne distribuent pas leurs notes comme un prof de collège, mais les motivent. Leurs rapports financiers sont fréquents et couvrent toute la planète Finance et s'obtiennent par abonnement. Ils sont épluchés par les analystes des banques, fonds divers, assurances, qui placent des sous sur les marchés, mais les traders des salles de marché se contentent souvent du résultat final sans éplucher les motifs.
D'une agence à l'autre les sensibilités, les méthodes diffèrent, aussi les notes ne peuvent être synchronisées entre agences et elles évoluent avec un décalage, mais elles ne se contredisent pas.
Pour 2012 ce n'est pas tant la perte d'un A qui est à noter que le pronostic négatif. Moody's confirme le triple A mais se réserve sur le pronostic qui jusqu'à aujourd'hui était "stable". Ce qui laisse comprendre qu'ils ont un doute. Avec les trois candidats en tête des sondages on peut les comprendre.
Fitch's a confirmé le triple A mais a dégradé son pronostic de stable à négatif, donc baissera la note cette année.
Dagong n'a pas molli, qui a continué à descendre la note française de AAA à AA- puis A+ en décembre avec perspective négative.
Tout le monde est dans le même sens, et pessimiste.
A l'examen plus attentif de la note de Moody's on voit que l'agence ne confirme pas le triple A mais simplement réserve sa décision car son travail n'est pas achevé. Elle indique déjà des incohérences économiques dans les décisions politiques. Le ton est carrément pessimiste. La vantardise de ces messieurs de Bercy va encore être punie.
RépondreSupprimermerci pour l 'info
RépondreSupprimer